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Democrats make more large spending cuts than Republicans
because they must counteract their prior partisan increases in
spending
The Democratic Party is characterized by its willingness to increase government spending to
pursue their policy goals. However, when they do make cuts, Democrats tend to make more large
cuts than Republicans. Sarah E. Anderson and Laurel Harbridge use data from U.S. budgetary
spending reports from 1955-2002 to explain this paradox, arguing that Democrats make cuts as
corrections to balance prior partisan decisions.
An empirical investigation of the U.S. budget reveals a puzzling pattern of spending. When they
do make cuts, Democrats make more large cuts than Republicans. This is exactly the opposite of
what we would expect from their ideological stances, but can be explained if these large changes
are made as corrections to prior increases in spending rather than ideologically motivated cuts.
Just like each of us, legislators have limited time to process the overwhelming amount of
information that enters the policymaking process. In the face of this barrage, they use shortcuts,
like uncritically pursing their partisan goals. In the realm of domestic spending, Democrats prefer
to increase spending and Republicans prefer to cut it. This is borne out empirically among year-
to-year domestic discretionary spending patterns: Democrats
increase spending, while Republicans make cuts. Yet
sometimes they must make corrections to these partisan
courses—either in response to an obvious signal from the
world around them or to correct a series of partisan decisions
that have resulted in spending that is too low or too high. We
call this motivated information processing, it is based on ideas
about motivated reasoning and disproportionate information
processing. It results in an increase in large cuts to spending
when Democrats control more of the lawmaking institutions.
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Budgetary CutsNote: Y-
axis measures the percent of subaccount cuts
that fall into the big cut category (greater than
50%). Only subaccounts that fall under
Democratic issue ownership are included.
These large cuts are especially prevalent on their own pet
issues, like social and environmental issues. These are
exactly where we’d expect them to employ partisan reasoning
most and to have to make the corrections. The cuts are also
more prevalent in off-election years, when lawmakers are less
likely to face the wrath of their supporters after they make the corrections. Our analysis of U.S. budgetary
spending from 1955-2002 reveals that increasing Democratic control from one lawmaking institution to unified
control (control of the Presidency, House, and Senate) corresponds to a 5% increase in the likelihood of a big cut
in spending. Among just those policies that are most closely associated with the Democratic Party, the change in
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the likelihood of a big cut when moving from one branch of Democratic control to unified Democratic control
increases to 13%.
The case of environmental spending on
federal land acquisition in early 1990s
exemplifies the pattern predicted by our
framework and seen in the empirical results.
Democrats, as the more pro-environmental
party, were typically more willing than
Republicans to add land to the public domain.
It was only when faced with very compelling
information that additional spending on public
lands would jeopardize commitments to
existing federal land management that
Democrats agreed to cut spending on land
acquisition. In 1993, after increasing the
budget in four out of the prior five years, the
unified Democratic government made a
drastic cut to the Bureau of Land Management
land acquisition subaccount. It took until 2000
to reach the 1992 level of spending again.
These patterns of spending changes are further
evidence that parties play a crucial role in
producing policy. In particular, they structure the
goals of their members, which can affect what
types of information is considered or ignored in
policymaking. Partisanship manifests in intuitive
ways, with more Democratic control associated
with more increases to spending on various
programs. But it also manifests in less obvious
ways when the accuracy goals of policymakers
drive them to make large corrections that result in
large cuts to budgetary subaccounts when
Democrats control more institutions of
government. This counterintuitive pattern
becomes predictable when we realize that
lawmakers, just like the rest of us, are subject to
bias but also want to make good public policy.
This post is based on the forthcoming article “The Policy Consequences of Motivated Information Processing
among the Partisan Elite,” which will appear in American Politics Research.
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